As social networking takes to the mobile world, smartphone apps provide users with ever-changing ways to interact with each other. Over the past couple of years, an increasing number of apps have entered the market offering end-to-end encryption, self-destructing messages, or some degree of anonymity. However, little work thus far has examined the properties they offer. We present a taxonomy of 18 of these apps: we first look at the features they promise in their appeal to broaden their reach and focus on 8 of the more popular ones. We present a technical evaluation, based on static and dynamic analysis, and identify a number of gaps between the claims and reality of their promises.
INTRODUCTION
Following Edward Snowden's revelations, privacy and anonymity technologies have been increasingly often in the news, with a growing number of users becoming aware -loosely speaking -of privacy and encryption notions [2] . Service providers have rolled out, or announced they will, more privacy-enhancing tools, e.g., support for end-to-end encryption or HTTPS by default. At the same time, a number of smartphone apps and mobile social networks have entered the market, promising to offer features like anonymity, ephemerality, and/or end-to-end encryption (E2EE). While it is not that uncommon to stumble upon claims like "military-grade encryption" or "NSA-proof" in the description of these apps, little work thus far has actually analyzed the guarantees they provide. This motivates the need for a systematic study of a careful selection of such apps. To this end, we compile a list of 18 apps that either offer E2EE, anonymity, ephemerality, or a combination of any two, focusing on 8 popular ones (Confide, Frankly Chat, Secret, Snapchat, Telegram, Whisper, Wickr, and Yik Yak). We review their functionalities and perform an empirical evaluation, based on static and dynamic analysis, aimed to compare the claims of the selected apps against results of our analysis.
Highlights of our findings include that "anonymous" social network apps Whisper and Yik Yak actually identify users with persistent distinct user IDs. Users' (previous) activities are restored Permission to make digital or hard copies of part or all of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for third-party components of this work must be honored. For all other uses, contact the owner/author(s). to their device after uninstalling and reinstalling the apps, and information collected by these apps could be used to de-anonymize them. We also find that the ephemeral-messaging app Snapchat does not always delete messages from its servers -in fact, "expired" chat messages are included in packets sent to the client. Then, we report that all actions performed by a user on Frankly Chat can be observed from the request URL, which is actually transmitted in the clear.
Note: An extended version of this poster abstract appears in [3] .
BUILDING AN APP CORPUS
We build a list of smartphone apps that are categorized as "anonymous" on Product Hunt 1 , and those popular among friends and colleagues. We then look at similar apps on Google Play, and focus on those described as offering end-to-end encryption, anonymity and/or ephemerality, as defined below:
Anonymity: is defined as the property that a subject is not identifiable within a set of subjects, known as the anonymity set [4] . In the context of this study, the term anonymity will be used to denote that users are anonymous w.r.t. other users of the service or w.r.t. the app service provider.
End-to-End Encryption (E2EE): Data exchanged between two communicating parties is encrypted in a way that only the sender and the intended recipient can decrypt it, so, e.g., eavesdroppers and service providers cannot read or modify messages.
Ephemerality:In cryptography, it denotes the property that encryption keys change with every message or after a certain period. Instead, here ephemerality is used to indicate that messages are not available to recipients from the user interface after a period of time [1] . For instance, in apps like Snapchat, messages "disappear" from the app (but may still be stored at the server) a few seconds after they are read.
First List. We initially select 18 apps, listed in Table 1 , where we also report their first release date, number of downloads as reported by Google Play, the kind(s) of content that can be shared, and whether the apps create persistent social links.
Apps Selection. We focus on apps with the most downloads that offer ephemerality, anonymity, E2EE, or, preferably, a combination of them. We reduce our selection to the top 8 apps (bold entries in Table 1 ) with most downloads, selecting an app with more than one of our desired property when there is more than one app with same number of download. We exclude Silent Circle and TigerText as they require paid subscription and registered company email respectively. 
ANALYSIS
Static Analysis. We perform static analysis of the 8 apps using dex2jar and JD-GUI to decompile them, aiming to analyze SS-L/TLS implementations and look for potential information leakage. We inspect the TrustManager and HostnameVerifier interfaces used to accept or reject a server's credentials. We find Frankly Chat, Whisper, and Wickr all contain Trust-Manager and HostnameVerifier that accept all certificates or hostnames. Alas, this makes it possible for an adversary to perform Man-in-The-Middle (MiTM) attacks and retrieve information sent on the sockets that use the vulnerable TrustManager and/or HostnameVerifier.
Dynamic Analysis. We conduct our experiments on a LG Nexus 4 running Android 5.1, that connects to a Wi-Fi access point under our control. We perform actions that include: sign-up, login, profile edit, send/read messages, while at the same time, monitoring traffic transmitted and received by the apps. We collect traffic using Wireshark and analyze unencrypted traffic to check for sensitive information transmitted in the clear. We also rely on HTTP proxies such as Fiddler and SSLSplit to mount Man-in-The-Middle (MiTM) attacks and decrypt HTTPS traffic. We used two different proxies because some Android apps are programmed to ignore proxy settings, hence, we used Fiddler as a regular proxy and SSLSplit as a transparent proxy.
When no proxy is used, traffic captured by Wireshark show that Frankly Chat leaks the Android advertising ID (a unique identifier) and Secret leaks Google Maps location requests (and responses). A summary of the results when a proxy is used is shown in Table 2 . We found that anonymous social networks Whisper and Yik Yak actually identify their users with distinct IDs that are persistent as previous activities like chats, whispers and yaks are restored to the device even if the user uninstalls and reinstalls the app. This behavior shows that, although they do not require users to provide their email or phone number, they can still persistently link -and possibly de-anonymize -users. Also, while Snapchat promises that messages will "disappear" after 10 seconds, they are not immedi- ately deleted from its servers, as old messages are actually included in responses sent to the clients even though not always.
